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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1619 
___________ 
 
TIMOTHY J. MUCHLER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STEVE GREENWALD;  
THE PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE, Luzerne County;  
HEAD OF PURCHASING DEPT. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-15-cv-00032) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 13, 2015 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 18, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 Pro se appellant Timothy Muchler appeals from the District Court’s orders 
dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and denying his motion for reconsideration.  Because we agree with the 
District Court and conclude that this appeal lacks arguable merit, we will dismiss it as 
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).    
 On January 6, 2015, Muchler commenced this civil action in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, naming Steve Greenwald of the 
Luzerne County Public Defender’s Office, the Public Defender’s Office, and the head of 
the Luzerne County Purchasing and Billing Department as Defendants (collectively, “the 
County Defendants”).  Muchler is a state prisoner incarcerated at State Correctional 
Institution – Laurel Highlands.1  Muchler’s primary contention is that he remodeled the 
Juvenile Unit of the Luzerne County Public Defender’s Office in May and June of 2014 
while on pre-work release and work release, but he was never compensated for his efforts 
despite having “contracted this work” with the Chief Public Defender, Defendant Steve 
Greenwald.  Muchler also alleged that he completed remodeling work in the break room 
of the Luzerne County Purchasing and Billing Department and was not paid for his 
services.  Muchler sought $21,500 in compensatory damages from the County 
Defendants, for the work performed at the Public Defender’s Office and the Purchasing 
and Billing Department.  He also sought to recover $110,000 in punitive damages and an 
additional $55,000 for pain and suffering. 
                                              
1  Muchler was previously incarcerated at the Luzerne County Prison in Wilkes-
Barre, Pennsylvania.   
 The Magistrate Judge assigned to the case screened Muchler’s complaint and his 
amended complaint2 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).   The Magistrate Judge 
concluded that Muchler’s complaints failed to state a claim against the County 
Defendants upon which relief may be granted and recommended that both be dismissed 
without prejudice to Muchler’s right to file an amended complaint within twenty (20) 
days.  No objections were made to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.  
Upon review, the District Court agreed that Muchler’s complaint, as amended, should be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  The District 
Court concluded, however, that granting leave to amend would be futile and, therefore, 
dismissed Muchler’s case with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).   
 Muchler filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as an amended notice of appeal.  
Muchler was notified that his appeal was subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2) or summary affirmance pursuant to Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 27.4 
and I.O.P 10.6.  Muchler was invited to submit written argument in support of his appeal, 
and he has done so.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  A federal court 
must dismiss an action or an appeal sua sponte if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who 
                                              
2  Three days after Muchler submitted the complaint in this case, he filed a “Motion 
to Amend Complaint”.  Although labeled as a motion, the filing itself constitutes an 
amended complaint, as it includes more extensive information explaining how he 
ultimately came to do the remodeling work at the Public Defender’s Office.  Both the 
Magistrate Judge and the District Court treated this filing as an amended complaint, and 
we refer to it throughout this opinion as such.  In making our determination under Section 
1915, we have fully considered both pleadings; additional facts alleged in the amended 
complaint do not affect our analysis.   
is immune from such relief.  Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  An appeal may be dismissed as frivolous “where it lacks an 
arguable basis either in law or in fact.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  
For the reasons set forth more fully below, we conclude that the District Court properly 
dismissed Muchler’s complaints and denied reconsideration; thus, the appeal from these 
orders lacks an arguable basis in law.   
 Our review of the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint for failure to 
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is plenary, as is our review of a 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 
(3d Cir. 2000); McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Although we review a denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion, we review the 
District Court’s “determination that amendment would be futile” de novo.  U.S. ex rel. 
Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)).  The standard 
for dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915 is the same as that applied pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Seiverling, 229 F.3d at 223.   
 Accordingly, we “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable 
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Phillips v. County of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 
292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).  To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’  A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (internal citation omitted)).  While a plaintiff’s 
“‘factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level,’” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (citation omitted), complaints filed pro se must be 
liberally construed.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).   
 Here, the District Court properly concluded that Muchler failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted because neither the complaint nor the amended 
complaint asserted a claim over which the District Court had jurisdiction.  At their core, 
the factual allegations of Muchler’s pleadings make clear that Muchler is asserting a state 
law breach of contract claim against the County Defendants over which original 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, or 1343(a)(3) is lacking.   
 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over 
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 1331.  With respect to Section 1983 claims, Section 1343(a)(3) further 
provides that district courts have original jurisdiction over any civil action authorized by 
law to be commenced by any person … [t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any 
State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or 
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress 
providing for equal rights[.]”  28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3).  The Magistrate Judge concluded 
that the complaint, as amended, sought relief for the breach of an oral employment 
contract, which does not “rise to the level of a cognizable violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment[.]”  The District Court adopted this finding and held that Muchler did not 
properly allege that he was deprived of a federally protected right as required for a 
Section 1983 claim.  We agree.   
 Although styled as a Section 1983 action, the factual allegations of Muchler’s 
pleadings make clear that Muchler is asserting a state law breach of contract claim.  “To 
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a person acting under color 
of state law engaged in conduct that violated a right protected by the Constitution or laws 
of the United States.”  Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).  As the Magistrate Judge 
and the District Court recognized, Muchler’s complaint and amended complaint are 
legally deficient, as neither the Constitution nor any federal law protects an individual 
citizen’s right to avoid the type of contract dispute alleged in this matter against the 
County Defendants.   
 Having determined that Muchler failed to allege a federal claim and was asserting 
a state law breach of contract claim against the County Defendants, the District Court 
could only have exercised jurisdiction over this claim if diversity jurisdiction was 
properly plead.  “Federal district courts are vested with original jurisdiction over civil 
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 and is 
between ‘citizens of different States.’”  McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 
281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)).  With respect to the amount in 
controversy, “[t]he sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made 
in good faith[,]” but it “must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less 
than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”  Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 
125, 135 (3d Cir.1999) (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 
283, 288–89 (1938)).  To determine if a claim meets the jurisdictional amount under § 
1332, the court must examine what damages are recoverable under state law.  See 
Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir. 1993).  In circumstances 
where “both actual and punitive damages are recoverable, punitive damages are properly 
considered in determining whether the jurisdictional amount has been satisfied.”  Id.  
However, claims for punitive damages “must be stricken from the amount in 
controversy” when they unavailable as a matter of law.  Id.    
 It is clear from the face of both the complaint and the amended complaint that 
diversity jurisdiction is lacking here.3  Muchler seeks approximately $21,500 in 
compensatory damages for the remodeling work he allegedly performed.  This amount 
falls well below the $75,000 threshold set forth in § 1332 and dismissal was justified 
given that it appears to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the 
jurisdictional amount.  See Dardovitch, 190 F.3d at 135.  Muchler’s claims for punitive 
                                              
3  The Magistrate Judge’s reliance on the parties’ residency was improper.  As this 
Court has previously recognized, averments that parties are “residents” of their respective 
states, rather than “citizens” or “domiciliaries” of those states, “are jurisdictionally 
inadequate” for purposes of determining diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.  McNair v. 
Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 219 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012).  Moreover, the Magistrate Judge 
was not in a position to assess Muchler’s citizenship, given his incarceration.  As a 
general rule, “[p]risoners presumptively retain their prior citizenship” while imprisoned.  
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2013).  The complaint and 
the amended complaint are devoid of any allegations regarding Muchler’s citizenship 
prior to the time he was incarcerated.     
damages and damages for pain and suffering are not sufficient to meet the $75,000 
jurisdictional threshold because these types of damages are not recoverable in breach of 
contract actions under Pennsylvania law.  See, e.g., Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., 
Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Thorsen v. Iron & Glass Bank, 476 A.2d 
928, 932 (Pa. Super. Ct.1984).  Because these damages are unavailable to Muchler as a 
matter of law, they are considered “patently frivolous and without foundation” such that 
they need not be considered in determining the amount in controversy.  See Packard, 994 
F.2d at 1046.   
 In dismissing Muchler’s complaint and his amended complaint, the District Court 
did not adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to allow Muchler leave to amend.  
Rather, the District Court concluded that amendment would be futile and dismissed 
Muchler’s claims with prejudice.  Generally, before dismissing a complaint, the district 
court should grant leave to amend unless the court determines that amendment would be 
futile.  Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).  “‘Futility’ means that the 
complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted[,]” 
and the district court should apply “the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies 
under Rule 12(b)(6)” in assessing futility.  Id.  As we have explained, Muchler has failed 
to allege any set of facts sufficient to support a Section 1983 claim here.  Moreover, the 
facts do not support the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over his state law breach of 
contract claims.  Leave to amend would have been futile in this circumstance because it is 
inconceivable that Muchler could allege additional facts arising out of the remodeling 
work he allegedly performed that would bring his claims within the original jurisdiction 
of the District Court.  Therefore, the District Court did not err when it dismissed 
Muchler’s complaint and his amended complaint without granting him leave to amend.4   
 Also before the Court is Muchler’s motion for appointment of counsel on appeal.  
Because Muchler’s appeal has no arguable merit as set forth above, we deny his motion 
for appointment of counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).    
 Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).     
 
                                              
4  After the District Court entered the Order dismissing Muchler’s case, Muchler 
filed a document designated as a “Motion to Amend [the] Complaint.”  The document 
itself, however, constitutes a second amended complaint.  The District Court dismissed 
the “motion” as moot given that the case was closed.  We construe Muchler’s filing as an 
attempt to seek reconsideration and offer yet another amended complaint.  The District 
Court properly denied reconsideration, as this document does not allege any new facts 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the District Court.     
